When Does Increasing Assailant Accountability and Managing Prosecution Caseloads Conflict? A System Dynamics Approach Using Analysis of Feedback Loop Dominance

Peter S. Hovmand
Washington University
George Warren Brown School of Social Work
Campus Box 1196
1 Brookings Drive
St. Louis MO 63130
(517) 485-3685 or
hovmandp@msu.edu

Lori A. Post
Institute for Children, Youth, and Families
Michigan State University

Christopher D. Maxwell
School of Criminal Justice
Michigan State University
 
Purpose: Mandatory domestic violence arrest policies have led to increases in the number of assailants arrested, prosecuted, and referred to batterer intervention programs. However, there have also been increases in the number of cases being denied or dismissed. This has raised questions and frustrations concerning whether or not prosecutor’s offices are holding batterers accountable. Specifically, are increasing domestic violence prosecutor caseloads undermining coordinated community response efforts to increasing assailant accountability? This poster presents findings that address the question in terms of the nonlinear feedback mechanisms driving prosecution caseloads and assailant accountability.
 
Method: Using a single case study design, data from a rural prosecutor’s office database (n=1458 cases) and key informant interviews (n=5) were used to build and test a system dynamics models (Richardson and Pugh, 1986) of prosecutor’s office domestic violence caseloads and dispositions. The fit between the resulting baseline model and numeric data was then compared using Theil (1966) inequality statistics. Ford’s (1999) behavioral approach was used to identifying shifts in feedback loop dominance with respect to accountability and prosecution caseload.
 
Results: Analysis of the baseline model revealed that accountability and prosecution caseloads were not directly related when caseloads were increasing. However, they were directly related via a common feedback mechanism when caseloads were stable, specifically, the allocation of prosecutor resources to warrant reviews. That is, mechanisms for managing domestic violence prosecution caseloads conflicted with mechanisms related to increasing assailant accountability, but only when the prosecution caseload had reached equilibrium.
 
Implications: 1. Policy resistance to increasing assailant accountability stemming from organizational caseload constraints is mostly likely to appear when the prosecutor’s office caseload is relatively stable. 2. Accounting for shifts in feedback loop dominance is essential for develop an understanding of the relationships between the structure and behaviors of complex social systems.